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RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-RECENT LEGISLATION IN MASSACHUSETTS,
MAINE AND CONNECTICUT-Three very significant statutes dealing with the
rule against perpetuities and containing identical language in their important provisions1 have recently been passed in Massachusetts, Maine, and
Connecticut. There are three basic provisions. (1) In applying the rule
against perpetuities to an interest limited to take effect at or after the termination of one or more life estates in, or lives of, persons in being when the
period of the rule begins to run, the validity of the interest shall be deter•
mined on the basis of the facts existing at the termination of the life estates
or lives. (2) If any interest would violate the rule against perpetuities because it is contingent upon any person attaining or failing to attain an
age in excess of 21, the age contingency shall be reduced to 21 as to all
persons subject to the same age contingency. (3) A fee simple determinable
or fee simple subject to a condition subsequent shall become a fee simple
absolute if the specified contingency does not occur within 30 years from
the date when the fee simple determinable or fee simple subject to condition subsequent becomes possessory. This also applies when the succeeding interest is limited to a person other than the grantor or his heirs. However, if such a fee is limited so that the specified contingency must happen
within the period of the rule against perpetuities, such interests shall take
effect as ·limited. This provision does not apply where the fee interest and
the succeeding interests are both given for public, charitable, or religious
purposes. Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 184A, §§1 to 3; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954;
Supp. 1955) c. 160, §§27 to 29; Conn. Laws (1955) p. 269.2
With the possible exception of a recent Pennsylvania statute3 the legislation under consideration is probably the most significant statutory revision of the rule against perpetuities since the passage of the "two lives"
statute in New York in 1830.4 The basic innovation of the first provision of
the principal statutes is that the validity of interests is to be determined
on the basis of actual rather than possible events. It thus seeks to avoid
certain pitfalls which, because of their rarity of occurrence, have often been
1 The language. and provisions of the statutes are identical except that Connecticut
has no severability clause and Connecticut and Maine have provisions as to what instruments the statute affects whereas the Massachusetts statute does not.
2 At the request of a subcommittee of the Massachusetts legislature, Professor W.
Barton Leach of the Harvard Law School prepared an explanation of the statute as an
aid to its interpretation. See Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67
HARV. L. REv. 1349 at 1356 (1954).
s Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §§301.4, 301.5, passed in 1947.
4 Statutory rules differing from the common law rule against perpetuities exist in about
fourteen states, exclusive of the principal legislation. Five states which once had statutory
rules have returned to the common law. Many states also have statutes directed at specific
problems. E.g.: Ala. Code (1941; Supp. 1953) tit. 47, §152 (1) (pension trust exempted
from rule against perpetuities); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §37b to 37h (50-year limitation
on possibilities of reverter and powers of termination). See, generally, Leach, "Perpetuities
Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. REv. 1349 (1954); 48 MICH. L. REv. 1158
(1950); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, part 25 (1952); 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Appendix
(1944).

724

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

overlooked by the unwary, for example, the unborn widow, 5 the fertile
octogenarian,6 the precocious toddler, 7 and the administrative contingency. 8
Because of the harshness of the rule's operation when applied to these cases,
there is legitimate ground for advocating revision. However, the principal
legislation introduces a modified version of the "second look" or "wait
and see" doctrine9 which brings new problems of its own.1 0 Under these
statutes the determination of the validity of an interest is deferred until
the termination of certain life estates or lives in being. Thus, there is a
period of time during which it cannot be ascertained to whom the future
interest belongs. This is contrary to the custom of our legal system to consider the validity of an interest at the time it arises,1 1 and as a natural consequence it hinders the alienability of land.12 It also creates problems as
to who can sue for waste, embezzlement of trust funds, and other wrongs
in order to protect a future interest.13 While the purpose of this provision
may be desirable, it should be possible to devise presumptions to avoid
specific pitfalls without introducing the "wait and see" doctrine.14
The two remaining sections do not seem to contain any objectionable
provisions. The second section of these statutes is modeled after the English
Law of Property Act of 192515 and is a limited introduction of the cy pres
doctrine which the courts apply to a charitable trust that fails. Some writers
have suggested a full application of the cy pres doctrine, 16 but, evidently,
this was not attempted by the draftsmen of the Massachusetts legislation for
5 Re Curryer's Will Trusts, [1938] Ch. 952; Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.
(2d) 672 (1944). But in Willis v. Hendry, 127 Conn. 653, 20 A. (2d) 375 (1941), the will
was construed to refer to the wife in being when the will was executed.
6 Jee v. Audley, [1787] 1 Cox Ch. 324 (70-year old woman presumed capable of having
issue). Contra, Worcester County Trust Co. v. Marble, 316 Mass. 294, 55 N.E. (2d) 446
(1944).
7 See Re Gaite's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459.
8 Estate of Campbell, 28 Cal. App. (2d) 102, 82 P. (2d) 22 (1938) (probate of will
might not be within the period of the rule).
9 This doctrine is followed by Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301, which directs
that the validity of interests be determined by actual rather than possible events. It has
been suggested that this doctrine is also supported by Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340,
108 N.E. (2d) 563 (1952) and Merchants Nat. Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A. (2d) 207
(1953). See Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1349
at 1352 (1954). But see Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and
,See' Doctrine," 52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 179 at 181 (1953).
10 See Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine,"
52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 179 (1953).
11 Id. at 184.
12 Id. at 188.
13 Id. at 185.
14 E.g.: a presumption in the unborn widow case that the testator meant the wife
in being when the will was executed; a presumption in the administrative contingency case
that the will will be probated within the period of the rule against perpetuities, etc.
15 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §163 (1925). For the same result at common law, see Edgerly v.
Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891).
16 Quarles, "The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule
Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation," 21 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. R.Ev. 385 (1946);
Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 707 at 733 (1955).

1956]

RECENT LEGISLATION

725

fear that such a change would be too radical to pass the legislature.17 By
easing the harshness of the common law rule against perpetuities, the principal statutes probably come much nearer the testator's intent and do not
add the new complications embodied in the "wait and see" doctrine.
The third provision, which puts a 30-year limit on possibilities of reverter and powers of termination, is also a step toward making titles to
land more marketable. Historically, the rule against perpetuities was never
applied to these interests18 because they antedated the rule. 1 0 Thus, if an
interest was given to a church so long as the land was used for church purposes, the property could be tied up forever. 20 Other jurisdictions have
passed statutes dealing with this particular problem21 and the English cases
have rejected this rule. 22
This is basically a moderate piece of legislation designed for easy adop•
tion. It presses neither the "wait and see" doctrine nor the cy pres doctrine
to the fullest extent. But neither does it deal with vested interests which
can also prevent the free marketability of land. 23 Before advocating its
adoption, however, it may be well to draft, as a standard for comparison,
a statute to accomplish the same objectives but which does not utilize the
"wait and see" doctrine. 24
David W. Swanson, S. Ed.
17 Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style,'' 67 HARv. L. REv. 1349 at
1353 (1954).
18 Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W. (2d) 448 (1950) (possibility of reverter);
Hinton v. Gilbert, 221 Ala. 309, 128 S. 604 (1930) (power of termination). See also 2
SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §§506, 507 (1936); 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §372 (1944).
10 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §372, comment a (1944).
20 See Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E. (2d) 922 (1950).
21 E.g.: III. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §37 (e); Minn. Stat. (1953) §500.20 (2); R.I. Acts
(1953) c. 3213.
22 In re Trustees of Hollis' Hospital, [1899] 2 Ch. 540 (power of termination); Hopper
v. Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213 (1944) (possibility of reverter). It would seem that the decision
in the Hopper case is in conflict with at least one single-judge decision of the High Court.
In re Chardon, [1928] 1 Ch. 464. Sec 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §24.62 (1952). See
also 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §4 (3) (1925), which applies the rule against perpetuities to powers
of termination.
23 Professor Simes advocates an extension of the rule to vested interests in "The Policy
Against perpetuities,'' 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 707 at 737 (1955).
24 See Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities,'' 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 707 (1955);
Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine," 52 MICH.
L. REv. 179 (1953).

